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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Defendants Darus Zehrbach and Alex Mervis appeal from 
jury verdicts convicting them each of two counts of bankruptcy 
fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).    
In their appeals, Zehrbach and Mervis asserted two grounds for 
reversal.  First, they argued that the district court erred in 
instructing the jury that the government need not prove, as an 
essential element of the crime, that they knew their actions to 
be illegal.  Second, they asserted that comments made by the 
  
prosecutor in his closing argument, regarding two of the defense 
witnesses, triggered a rule of per se reversal under United 
States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1990).  Their appeals 
were first heard by a panel of this court.  On the basis of the 
panel decision, Zehrbach and Mervis petitioned for rehearing in 
banc, which was granted as to both issues.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will overrule our ruling in DiLoreto, insofar as it 
established a per se rule,1 and we will affirm the convictions.   
 I. 
 In the late summer or fall of 1989, appellant, Darus 
Zehrbach, a West Virginia businessman doing business under the 
name of Consolidated Assets Management Corporation ("CAMCORP"), 
formulated a plan to purchase the assets of bankrupt aircraft 
manufacturing companies.  Zehrbach became particularly interested 
in Taylorcraft Aviation Corporation ("Taylorcraft"), a company 
located in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, that was in the process of a 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.2  Zehrbach retained the 
Pittsburgh investment banking firm, Drizos Investments, Inc., to 
facilitate the acquisition by locating other investors and 
securing financing.   
                     
 
   1 In overruling the per se rule announced in DiLoreto, we do 
not, based upon the facts presented in that case, in any way 
overrule the result reached by the DiLoreto court in reversing 
the convictions. 
    
2
 Largely because of a failed $458,000 bid to purchase 
Taylorcraft at a prior bankruptcy auction, the Taylorcraft 
bankruptcy proceeding had been converted from a Chapter 11 
debtor-in-possession proceeding into a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
  
 Appellant, Alex A. Mervis, a stock broker and a 
licensed pilot, had recently become an employee at Drizos 
Investments.  Because of his aviation background, he was assigned 
to Zehrbach's project.  Steven Drizos supervised Mervis's work on 
this assignment.  Robert Smith of Capital Resources Group, a firm 
affiliated with Drizos Investments, was brought in to help with 
financing.  Eventually, Mervis located John Polychron, a North 
Carolina investor, who agreed to become a limited partner in an 
association in which Zehrbach was to be the general partner. 
 The bankruptcy trustee for Taylorcraft was Charles 
Szybist, an attorney in Williamsport, Pennsylvania.  Szybist 
contacted a number of potential bidders in an attempt to generate 
an offer that would be substantial enough to create a base for 
aggressive bidding.  In September 1989, Szybist received a bid of 
$155,000 from Leander Research, Manufacturing and Distributing, 
Inc. ("Leander").  Using this as his base, Szybist notified 
creditors and other parties in interest of the offer, inviting 
higher bids to be submitted by October 23, 1989.  The notice 
provided that Leander and all other higher, qualifying bidders 
would be permitted to participate at a final private auction to 
be held on October 30, 1989.   
 Three new parties, including Zehrbach through CAMCORP, 
entered bids.  T. Chester Baker made a bid of $156,000; Starman 
Brothers Auctions bid $160,000; and CAMCORP bid $165,000.  
CAMCORP's bid had been agreed upon at a joint meeting between 
  
Zehrbach, Polychron, Drizos, Smith, and Mervis.  Because the 
names of the bidders were released, the Zehrbach group was in a 
position to contact the other bidders.  Zehrbach instructed 
Mervis to negotiate a "buy-out" of their bidding positions.  
Baker, for reasons unrelated to the case, lost interest in the 
acquisition.  The other parties remained serious.  According to 
Mervis, he did not hesitate to follow Zehrbach's instructions 
because Zehrbach was a bankruptcy expert who "did this all of the 
time."  
 Steven Starman, of Starman Brothers Auctions, testified 
at trial that he would have bid up to "$200,000 plus" for 
Taylorcraft.  Appendix ("App.") at 189.   On October 25, Starman 
received a call from Mervis who asked what it would take to keep 
Starman out of the bidding process.  Starman agreed to withdraw 
from the bidding for a payment of $40,000, with $10,000 to be 
paid up-front and the remainder by January 1990.  A draft 
agreement was sent from Mervis's office at Drizos Investments to 
Starman for his signature and return.  The document 
mischaracterized the nature of the payment as made "[i]n return 
for services renderd [sic]."  Starman also received a form of 
notice that he was to sign, have notarized, and send to the 
bankruptcy judge, informing the bankruptcy court of his 
withdrawal from the bidding process.  Upon receiving these 
documents, Starman consulted his attorney, David Buelt, a 
specialist in trusts and estates, who redrafted the agreement to 
  
state that Starman Brothers Auctions was being paid to forgo its 
right to bid at the October 30 sale of Taylorcraft's assets.  
Steven Starman did not question Buelt about the legality of the 
agreement but merely expressed concerns about its enforceability.  
The parties executed the amended agreement, and, once Starman had 
received the initial $10,000 by wire transfer, he telephoned 
Szybist to inform him that he would no longer be participating in 
the bidding for Taylorcraft. 
 Leander Eckard, the president of Leander and the only 
other potential bidder, testified at trial that he would have 
been willing to bid up to approximately $250,000 for the purchase 
of Taylorcraft.  App. at 179.  Sometime shortly after the October 
23 close of bidding, Mervis had contacted Eckard to discuss how 
much it would cost to purchase his bidding position.  Although at 
first Eckard was not interested, he began to reconsider his 
position after he encountered difficulty in obtaining financing 
for the potential acquisition.  Eckard's initial request was for 
a payment of $100,000, but Zehrbach instructed Mervis to 
negotiate a lower figure.  On October 26, Eckard and Mervis 
agreed on a $50,000 fee with $30,000 payable immediately and the 
remainder covered by a promissory note and security in one of the 
Taylorcraft airplanes.  Eckard had planned to fly from Seattle, 
Washington, to visit the Taylorcraft plant the next day, October 
27, the last business day before the auction on October 30.  He 
  
agreed to meet Mervis at the Pittsburgh airport to finalize the 
bid buy-out. 
 To document the agreement with Eckard, Mervis contacted  
Charles Vollmer, a Pittsburgh attorney.  Vollmer had worked with 
Drizos Investments in the past.  Mervis and Vollmer met at 7:30 
a.m. on October 27.  Vollmer prepared three documents before 
departing for a 10:00 a.m. appointment.  These documents were (1) 
a Letter of Intent for the limited partnership between Zehrbach 
and Polychron, which had not yet been formally created; (2) a 
letter to Polychron on Vollmer's firm letterhead with 
instructions on making the $30,000 wire transfer to Eckard; and 
(3) a bid buy-out agreement reflecting the terms of the 
negotiations between Mervis and Eckard.  Like the revised 
agreement with Starman, the bid buy-out agreement stated that, in 
exchange for the payment, Leander "agree[d] to sell to TAC 
[Taylorcraft Acquisition Corporation, Zehrbach's group] all of 
its rights . . . [with regard to its bid for Taylorcraft] and, 
further, agree[d] not to participate either in its own right or 
through third parties in the bidding process." 
 At the time he drafted the documents, Vollmer knew very 
little about the transaction and had not conducted any legal 
research on the issues.  After drafting the bid buy-out 
agreement, Vollmer expressed his uneasiness about the transaction 
to Mervis, stating that he "hoped this thing [was] legal."   
  
 During the afternoon of October 27, after Vollmer was 
able to consult two other attorneys and to do some legal 
research, he faxed a letter to Mervis and Smith explaining: 
 Under the terms of the Agreement, Taylorcraft 
Acquisition Corporation would buy out 
Leander's "position" in the Bankruptcy Court.  
Prior to this morning, I had thought that the 
"position" that was being bought out, if 
indeed there was one being bought out, was 
that of a secured creditor.  I simply 
remarked to Alex that, "I hope this [is] 
legal." 
 
Mr. Vollmer then quoted, verbatim, the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 152, the statute under which Zehrbach and Mervis were later 
charged.  Vollmer's letter concluded:   
  At this point, I must advise you that in 
my opinion, there is a possibility that this 
action violates these criminal provisions. 
Unless this matter is somehow reworked so 
that it is not a possible violation, such as 
a possible joint venture with Leander, I 
cannot recommend that you participate any 
further.  Please advise. 
App. at 61-62. 
 In the interim, after meeting with Vollmer, Mervis had 
gone to the airport to meet Eckard.  Mervis gave Eckard the buy-
out agreement, which Zehrbach had signed, and a $30,000 certified 
check.  Mervis assured Eckard of the legality of the transaction, 
stating that his attorney had approved it.  Eckard had already 
  
called Szybist to inform him that he would not be coming to view 
the Taylorcraft plant or to place a bid.    
 Upon Mervis's return to his office that afternoon, he 
was informed of the Vollmer letter which questioned the legality 
of the bid buy-out scheme.  Vollmer, Mervis, and Smith then held 
a conference call with Zehrbach to inform him of Vollmer's 
concerns.  Zehrbach dismissed Vollmer's opinion, suggesting that 
Vollmer did not know what he was talking about.  After Drizos and 
Smith requested a second legal opinion, Zehrbach contacted his 
West Virginia attorney, James D. Crane, who had bankruptcy 
experience.  Crane affirmed the legality of the transaction, but 
he characterized it as a joint venture that had merged bidding 
interests.  Crane was never informed that two bidders had been 
paid to withdraw their bids. 
 After both Starman and Leander withdrew from the 
bidding process just days before the auction was to occur, 
Szybist called  Mervis and spoke of his concern that the other 
bidders "were having some difficulties."  In response, Mervis 
suggested not that there had been payments to withdraw, but 
rather that "we had formed a joint venture and we had merged our 
bidding interest."  Szybist decided to postpone the auction from 
October 30 to November 15 and to make it public rather than 
private.  At the auction, the Zehrbach-Polychron group was the 
only bidder.  Szybist accepted its bid of $165,000.   
  
 Shortly after the final sale, Szybist contacted the FBI 
about the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the Starman 
and Leander bids.  After an FBI investigation, Mervis and 
Zehrbach were indicted, tried, and convicted of one count of 
conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371,3 and of two counts of bankruptcy fraud, pertaining to 
actions with regard to Starman and Eckard, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 152.4  Specifically, Zehrbach and Mervis were charged 
with conspiring to pay two bidders for the assets of Taylorcraft 
to refrain from bidding in a bankruptcy auction, with actually 
paying the bidders to refrain from bidding, and with purchasing 
the assets as the sole bidders. 
                     
 
    
3
  Section 371, conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud 
United States, provides in part: 
 
 If two or more persons conspire either to commit 
any offense against the United States, or to 
defraud the United States, or any agency 
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and 
one or more of such persons do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, each 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.   
 
    
4
  Section 152, concealment of assets; false oaths and 
claims; bribery, provides in part: 
 
 Whoever knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, 
receives or attempts to obtain any money or 
property, remuneration, compensation, reward, 
advantage or promise thereof, for acting or 
forbearing to act in any case under title 11; 
 . . . 
 Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both.   
  
   Because the defendants did not substantively contest 
the actions attributed to them, the sole issue at trial was that 
of intent.  Mervis and Zehrbach defended themselves on the basis 
of their good faith belief that they had done nothing illegal.  
Zehrbach's position, as stated by his counsel, was that Zehrbach 
had made a mistake, just as the three attorneys involved in the 
transaction, Buelt, Vollmer, and Szybist, had made a similar 
mistake, and that Zehrbach could not have had fraudulent intent.  
Mervis testified that he was working on a joint venture to merge 
the bidding interests.  Mervis also emphasized that Drizos and 
Smith had supervised his involvement in the project.  Mervis's 
counsel argued that because Mervis was acting in good faith to 
form a joint venture, he had no intention to deceive.  The 
government contended, on the other hand, that Zehrbach and Mervis 
knowingly paid the other bidders to withdraw from the auction, 
thereby keeping down the price paid for the Taylorcraft assets 
and, as a consequence, cheating the creditors of Taylorcraft and 
the bankruptcy trustee.   
 This question of good faith and knowledge of the law 
became an issue in the formulation of the jury charge.  The 
district judge proposed first to list the essential elements of 
the substantive offense and to follow that with a detailed 
discussion of the requirements that the acts be performed 
"knowingly" and "fraudulently."  He would then, as Zehrbach and 
Mervis requested, give an instruction on "good faith." 
  
 Although Zehrbach and Mervis fully concurred in the 
scope and content of the good faith instruction,5 they challenged 
a portion of the "knowingly" instruction, in which the court 
stated that "[t]he government is not required to prove that a 
defendant knew that his acts were unlawful."  When the district 
judge stated that he was going to leave this sentence in the 
instructions, counsel for Mervis requested, "May I have argument 
on that just to preserve my objection on the record?"  App. at 
608 (emphasis added).  The district judge replied:  "Sure.  I 
know you objected to that."  Id.  Counsel for Zehrbach then 
argued that the instruction had "the potential of confusing the 
jury."  Counsel suggested: 
 By telling the jurors that the government is 
not required to prove that the defendant knew 
his acts were unlawful, the jurors may 
misconstrue that to mean that it is not 
relevant that the defendant did not know that 
his acts were unlawful.   
 
Id. at 609.  Counsel asked that the sentence be deleted "in the 
interest of clarity" because of the potential for confusion and 
"because the instructions clearly state[d] the burden of the 
government and [did] not state that [proof of knowledge of 
illegality] [was] one of the burdens of the government, because 
it [hadn't] been suggested that this is one of the burdens of the 
                     
    
5
  At a pre-charge conference, the district court asked each 
party for their response to the court's rewrite of the good faith 
instruction.  Mervis' counsel said that it was "satisfactory," 
and Zehrbach's counsel found it to be "really much better than 
[the] original good faith defense instruction."  App. at 601-02. 
  
government and because it [would] not be suggested that is one of 
the burdens of the government . . .."  Id. 
 The following excerpt from the jury charge, which fills 
twenty-six pages of trial transcript in its entirety, places the 
remark in context.  Topic headings have been inserted for the 
ease of the reader.  The instructions were as follows: 
 [1.  The Elements] 
 
  In order to meet its burden of proof [on 
the bankruptcy counts] as to either defendant 
the government must establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt each one of the following 
elements:  First, that the defendant gave or 
offered any money, property, remuneration, 
compensation, reward, advantage or promise of 
any of those things to another in exchange 
for that other person's acting or forbearing 
to act; second, that the action or 
forbearance, in exchange for which the money, 
property, advantage or promise thereof was 
given or offered, was in a case under Title 
11 of the United States Code, the bankruptcy 
law; third, that the defendant gave or 
offered the money, property, advantage or 
promise thereof knowingly; and fourth, that 
the defendant did so fraudulently. 
 
 [2.  "Knowingly"] 
 
  Now, in order to find a defendant guilty 
of bankruptcy fraud, therefore you must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the giving or 
offering of money, property, remuneration, 
compensation, reward, advantage or promise 
thereof was done knowingly.  An act is done 
knowingly if it is done voluntarily and 
intentionally and not because of mistake or 
accident or other innocent reason.  In other 
words, an act is done knowingly if the 
defendant is aware of the act and is not 
committing the act through ignorance, 
mistake, or accident.  The government is not 
  
required to prove that a defendant knew that 
his acts were unlawful. 
  It is also necessary . . . that you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knew that his acts were in connection with a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  You may consider 
evidence of a defendant's words, acts or 
omissions along with all other evidence in 
deciding whether a defendant acted knowingly. 
 
 [3.  "Fraudulently"] 
 
  Also, . . . you must . . . find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the giving or offering 
of money, property, remuneration, 
compensation, reward, advantage or promise 
thereof was done fraudulently.  In a 
bankruptcy case, an act is done fraudulently 
if it is done with the intent to defraud the 
creditors of the bankrupt entity or with the 
intent to defraud the United States or the 
trustee in bankruptcy concerning their right 
and governmental function of regulating 
bankruptcies and fairly distributing the 
assets of the bankrupt entity. 
  Now, to act with fraudulent intent . . . 
means to act knowingly and with the specific 
intent to deceive, ordinarily for the purpose 
[of] either causing some financial loss to 
another or bringing about some financial gain 
to one's self [sic]. 
  Now, intent ordinarily may not be proved 
directly because there is no way of fathoming 
or scrutinizing the operations of the human 
mind, but you may infer a defendant's intent 
from the surrounding circumstances.  You may 
consider any statements made and done or 
omitted by a defendant and all other facts 
and circumstances in evidence which indicate 
his state of mind.   
  To act with a fraudulent intent a person 
must act knowingly and with the intention or 
the purpose to deceive or to cheat, in this 
case either to deceive or to cheat the 
creditors of Taylorcraft Aviation Corporation 
or the bankruptcy trustee. 
 
  
 [Passage distinguishing intent and motive 
omitted.] 
 
 [4.  "Good faith"] 
 
  Now, a defendant may contend that he did 
not act with the specific intent to commit 
the crimes with which he is charged since he 
acted in good faith.  A good faith is a 
complete defense to charges of acting with 
fraudulent intent because good faith is 
simply inconsistent with the intent to 
defraud.  A person acts with fraudulent 
intent and without good faith when he acts 
with a purpose to deceive or to cheat, and so 
as to deprive another person of a right or 
property.  While the term good faith has no 
precise definition, it means, among other 
things, an absence of an intention of taking 
advantage of another. 
  The burden of proving that a defendant 
did not act in good faith is on the 
government.  In determining whether a 
defendant acted in good faith you should 
consider all of the evidence in the case 
bearing on that defendant's state of mind.   
  If the evidence leaves you with a 
reasonable doubt as to whether a defendant 
acted with the intent to defraud, or in good 
faith, you must acquit him.  On the other 
hand, if you find that the government has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 
other elements of the charged crimes and that 
a defendant did not act in good faith, then 
you should find that defendant guilty. 
(Emphasis added). 
 At the conclusion of the reading of the jury charge, 
defense counsel renewed their objections to the instruction that 
the government was not required to prove that a defendant knew 
his acts were illegal.  App. at 726.   
  
 Zehrbach and Mervis also objected during closing 
argument to comments that the prosecutor made in regard to Drizos 
and Smith, whom the defense had called as witnesses to support 
Mervis's testimony that he believed he was creating a legal joint 
venture to acquire Taylorcraft.  In his closing argument, the 
prosecutor suggested that neither Drizos nor Smith was "worthy of 
belief," citing testimony which cast doubt on their credibility.  
Specifically, the prosecutor pointed to Drizos's failure to 
inform Polychron that an attorney had advised Drizos to refrain 
from further action in connection with the buy-outs.  He 
similarly noted Drizos's failure to ensure that his employee 
(Mervis) stop his involvement in potentially illegal activity.  
The prosecutor also cited the inconsistencies between what Smith 
had told the FBI and Smith's testimony in court.  The prosecutor 
then commented: 
 
 I suggest you shouldn't believe Drizos and 
Smith because they're guilty of exactly the 
same bankruptcy fraud that these two 
defendants are guilty of.  And don't you 
assume that they are not going to get what's 
coming to them either.     
 Both defense counsel immediately objected to this 
statement.  The district judge granted their motion to strike.  
He cautioned the jury to "disregard the last statement of the 
prosecutor with respect to what may or may not happen with 
respect to these two gentlemen."  Moreover, the judge 
subsequently instructed the members of the jury to disregard 
  
counsel's personal opinions and to make decisions based solely on 
the evidence.  He then reminded the jury not to consider any 
evidence that he had instructed them to disregard in the course 
of the proceedings. 
 Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that the second comment was irrelevant and was based upon 
information outside the record.  The district court denied the 
motion, citing its curative instructions and questioning whether 
the statement "could have resulted . . . in any serious prejudice 
to either defendant."  Similarly, in denying Zehrbach's motion 
for a new trial, the district court held that the first sentence 
of the statement was properly based on evidence of the witnesses' 
own guilt that had been adduced at trial and that any improper 
inference that might have been induced by the second sentence had 
been cured by the court's instructions.  United States v. 
Zehrbach, No. 92-0218, mem. op. at 8-9 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 7, 1993). 
 Following the jury verdict, the district judge 
sentenced Zehrbach to a term of imprisonment of 21 months, 
followed by three years of supervised release, and sentenced 
Mervis to 10 months of imprisonment, followed by two years of 
supervised release.  Zehrbach and Mervis base their appeal on the 
two issues of the jury instructions and of the prosecutor's 
remarks in closing argument. 
  
       The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988), and this court is vested 
with appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  
 
  II.  THE JURY CHARGE. 
 A. 
 Zehrbach and Mervis objected to the trial judge's 
instruction that "the government is not required to prove that a 
defendant knew that his acts were unlawful" on the grounds, 
expressed by counsel, that it had "the potential of confusing the 
jury."  Defense counsel suggested that "[b]y telling the jurors 
that the government is not required to prove that the defendant 
knew his acts were unlawful, the jurors may misconstrue that to 
mean that it is not relevant that the defendant did not know his 
acts were unlawful."  Although neither Zehrbach or Mervis's 
attorney proposed any clarifying language, they asked that the 
sentence be dropped "in the interest of clarity." 
   The extent of the grounds for defense counsels' 
objection to the challenged instruction are not entirely clear 
from the record.  The objection could be construed as a challenge 
to the trial court's inclusion of the instruction as a matter of 
law.  Alternatively, the objection could be read as a challenge 
merely to the confusing nature of the instruction.  The basis of 
the objection determines the appropriate standard of review.  We 
will consider the issue first as a review of the legal propriety 
  
of the instructions.  In this light, if the objection is 
construed as a challenge to the court's statement of the legal 
standard, we exercise plenary review.  United States v. McGill, 
964 F.2d 222, 235 (3d Cir. 1992); Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 
1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989).  In connection with a review of the 
legal sufficiency of the instructions, however, if we were to 
determine that counsel had not objected at trial to the court's 
statement of the legal standard, we would review the legal 
propriety of the instructions on a "plain error" standard.6  
Whether we exercise plenary review or apply the plain error 
standard, however, we conclude that the court did not err in 
stating the relevant legal principles. 
 Zehrbach and Mervis concede that the jury charge 
correctly stated the government's burden of proof.  The jury 
instruction did not omit any of the four essential elements of 
bankruptcy fraud.  The trial judge properly instructed the jury 
that the government was required to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt:        
                     
    
6
 Where a party has not made a clear, specific objection to 
the charge that he alleges is erroneous at trial, he waives the 
issue on appeal "unless the error was so fundamental and highly 
prejudicial as to constitute plain error."  Bennis v. Gable, 823 
F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted); see 
also United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 250-53 (3d Cir.)  
(examining the court's failure to define the burden of proof 
applicable to a duress defense for plain error where the party 
objected to the court's failure to give the defendant's proposed 
duress instruction), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 592 (1991); United 
States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1128-30 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986).   
  
 First, that the defendant gave or offered any 
money, property, remuneration, compensation, 
reward, advantage or promise of any of those 
things to another in exchange for that other 
person's acting or forbearing to act; second, 
that the action or forbearance, in exchange 
for which the money, property, advantage or 
promise thereof was given or offered, was in 
a case under Title 11 of the United States 
Code, the bankruptcy law; third, that the 
defendant gave or offered the money, 
property, advantage or promise thereof 
knowingly; and fourth, that the defendant did 
so fraudulently. 
 
App. at 716. 
 
 Zehrbach and Mervis do not argue that the elements of 
bankruptcy fraud were improperly set out.  They contend, however, 
that the challenged instruction, contained in the court's further 
explanation of the element "knowingly," contradicted the court's 
good faith instruction.  As set out infra, the trial judge had 
instructed the jury that good faith is a complete defense to 
bankruptcy fraud and that the government must prove that a 
defendant did not act in good faith.  Zehrbach and Mervis made 
the good faith charge relevant by their claim that they were 
involved, not in an attempt to silence competing bidders, but 
merely in a joint venture with Starman and Leander to acquire 
Taylorcraft.  
 Our first consideration in reviewing defendants' 
argument is whether a good faith defense was necessary in view of 
the description of the elements of bankruptcy fraud which the 
district court gave to the jury.  If the jury found beyond a 
  
reasonable doubt that, by paying competitors not to bid in the 
auction, Zehrbach and Mervis acted with fraudulent intent to 
deceive or to cheat the creditors of Taylorcraft Aviation 
Corporation or the bankruptcy trustee, it would be inconsistent 
with this conclusion for the jury also to find that Zehrbach and 
Mervis had acted with good faith.  When a jury has determined 
that an accused has intended to cheat his victim, the possibility 
that the accused also acted in good faith has been eliminated. 
 Because the trial judge had delivered detailed 
instructions regarding the elements of bankruptcy fraud, and in 
particular regarding the element of acting with fraudulent 
intent, the good faith instruction became in fact superfluous.  
The good faith instruction merely reiterated that the government 
carried the burden of demonstrating that the defendants did act 
with the requisite fraudulent intent.   
 Moreover, as Zehrbach and Mervis acknowledge, proof of 
knowledge of illegality is not a burden of the government in a 
bankruptcy fraud case.  The statutory requirement that the 
underlying acts be performed "knowingly" requires only that the 
act be voluntary and intentional and not that a person knows that 
he is breaking the law.  See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 
192, 199 (1991) (stating that as a general rule, the government 
is not required to prove the criminal defendant's knowledge of 
the illegality of his actions); United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 
1033, 1038 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988). 
  
 The instant case differs from those cases involving 
criminal offenses for which proof of knowledge of illegality is 
an element of the government's prima facie case.  In such cases, 
mistake of law is a complete defense.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court recently held that the "willfulness" element of the anti-
structuring provision of the financial transaction reporting 
requirements, contained at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) & 5324, requires 
proof of knowledge of illegality.  See Ratzlaf v. United States, 
114 S.Ct. 655, 658 (1994).  The Court based its holding upon a 
strict reading of the statutory language of the two sections.  
Section 5324 provides that it is illegal to "structure" financial 
transactions "for the purpose of evading" a financial 
institution's reporting requirements.  Section 5322(a) 
establishes that "a person willfully violating" the anti-
structuring provision (§ 5324) is subject to criminal penalties.  
The Court found that failure to read knowledge of illegality into 
a violation prosecuted under § 5322 would -- in light of § 5324's 
purposefulness requirement -- treat "§ 5322(a)'s `willfulness' 
requirement essentially as surplusage."  Id. at 659-60.  In 
concluding, the Court stated that it did not "dishonor the 
venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no 
defense to a criminal charge" and emphasized that its decision 
was particular to the plain meaning of the statute then before 
it.7  Id. at 663.  See also Staples v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 
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 Since Ratzlaf was decided, Congress has amended § 5324 so 
that it contains its own criminal penalty provision, making 
  
1793, 1804 (1994) (government required to prove defendant knew of 
the features of his semiautomatic firearm which brought it within 
the scope of the National Firearms Act, requiring registration of 
fully automtic weapons); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 
568-69 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the Ratzlaf willfulness standard 
by analogy where the prosecution alleged a violation of the 
disclosure obligations imposed under the Election Campaign Act); 
United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d at 1102 (noting that belief in 
legality is a complete defense to the crime of making false 
statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission where the 
parties stipulated that the Government had the burden of showing 
that the defendant acted with knowledge of the wrongfulness of 
his actions). 
     We conclude, in light of the elements making up the 
offense of bankruptcy fraud, particularly the element of intent 
to defraud the creditors or the trustee of the bankruptcy estate, 
that a defendant's good faith belief in the lawfulness of his 
conduct is not a defense to bankruptcy fraud.  In a case like the 
present one, where the defendants have claimed they were 
(..continued) 
resort to § 5322(a) unnecessary.  The amended provision does not 
refer to a mental state but declares that "[w]hoever violates 
this section shall be fined in accordance with title 18, United 
States Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both."  
1994 Riegle Community Development and Regulation Improvement Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2253 (1994).  Because the 
provision no longer incorporates the willfulness requirement of 
§ 5322(a), the only mental state that the Government must prove 
in prosecutions for structuring is the purpose of having a 
financial institution not file a required report. 
  
attempting to set up a joint venture, a belief that acquisition 
of Taylorcraft through a joint venture was proper would be 
relevant for the jury to consider in determining if there was 
intent to defraud.  However, the element of "knowledge of 
illegality" which is required in federal criminal tax offenses, 
see Cheek, 498 U.S. at 192, or in the violation of election 
disclosure obligations, see Curran, 20 F.3d at 569, is not a 
required element of bankruptcy fraud.  Therefore, proof by a 
defendant of lack of knowledge of illegality cannot in and of 
itself defeat a conviction for bankruptcy fraud.8 
 
 In challenging the legal sufficiency of the charge on 
knowledge of illegality, Zehrbach and Mervis also argue that the 
inclusion of the statement unconstitutionally shifted the burden 
of proof or precluded the jury from considering proper 
exculpatory information.  They rely primarily on two cases, 
United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1989) and United 
States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1977), both of which 
we find to be distinguishable. 
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 For this reason, we do not find error in the district 
court's ruling, if the court in fact did so rule, that defense 
counsel could not argue that good faith is a defense if there is 
a mistake as to the law, see App. at 607-08, so long as the 
element of intent to defraud had to be proved by the government 
beyond a reasonable doubt and so long as the jury could consider 
the defendant's state of mind in making its determination on 
intent to defraud.  It is because we find that these latter two 
requirements were met in this case that we do not find such a 
ruling would have been erroneous. 
  
 In Rhone, the defendant appealed her conviction for 
mail fraud and theft arising out of her continued receipt of 
unemployment benefits after she had become employed full time.  
As in the instant case, the government had the burden of 
establishing specific intent to defraud, and the defendant's sole 
defense was that she lacked the requisite intent, i.e., that she 
didn't believe that her employment qualified as "full time" 
employment.  At the close of the case, the trial court gave a 
standard jury instruction on specific intent to defraud but ended 
the instruction with the following statement:  "And I should 
point out at this time that ignorance of the law is no excuse."  
United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d at 834. 
 Suggesting that the quoted instruction eased the 
government's burden of proving specific intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt or at least "confused the jury on the very 
central issue of intent," the D.C. Circuit found that the 
statement created constitutional error requiring a new trial.  
Id. at 836-37.  The court concluded that 
 [t]he jury . . . could well have inferred 
that the prosecution had met its burden of 
proving specific intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt simply on the basis that appellant was 
presumed to know the law and that she 
therefore knowingly committed fraud and 
theft. 
 
Id. at 837. 
 
 We believe that the instruction in Rhone went far 
beyond the instruction given in this case.  That instruction 
  
effectively told the jury that ignorance of the law is 
irrelevant, suggesting -- incorrectly -- that the jury should not 
even consider the defendant's lack of knowledge of the law 
regarding her legal entitlement to unemployment benefits.  In the 
instant case, the court merely instructed the jury that the 
government was not required to prove that the defendants knew 
their actions to be illegal.  This instruction correctly stated 
the government's burden of proof in this case and in addition was 
made pursuant to a charge in which the district court instructed 
the jury no less that three times, once each in connection with 
the defense of "good faith" and the elements of "knowingly" and 
"fraudulently," that they "should consider all of the evidence in 
the case bearing on that defendant's state of mind."   
 Schilleci involved the appeal of a conviction for 
conspiring to intercept wire and oral communications, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.  This offense is a crime of 
specific intent and has been held to require an intentional or 
reckless disregard of legal obligations.  See Malouche v. JH 
Management Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1024, 1025 (4th Cir. 1988) (§2511 
was intended "to denote at least a voluntary, intentional 
violation of, and perhaps also a reckless disregard of, a known 
legal duty", citing Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 
1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984)).  For this reason we do 
not find that the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Schilleci is 
helpful to our consideration of an offense, like bankruptcy 
  
fraud, where the government must prove intent to cheat or defraud 
but where there is not a duty for the government to prove that 
the defendant knew his acts were illegal. 
 Contrary to the arguments of Zehrbach and Mervis, we 
find that the charge in the instant case fairly and adequately 
submitted the issues to the jury for determination.  The charge 
accurately stated the government's burden of proof.  It did not 
preclude consideration of defendants' claim that they thought 
they were putting together a joint venture and that they did not 
know that what they were doing was illegal.  Importantly, the 
challenged instruction did not shift the government's burden of 
proving fraudulent intent.  At the same time, however, it did not 
preclude the jury from considering exculpatory information which 
Zehrbach and Mervis introduced in an effort to establish their 
defense.  Rather, the instruction merely explained that proof of 
knowledge of illegality was not a burden of the government's case 
in chief.  We conclude that the court did not err as a matter of 
law in setting forth the legal standards governing the jury's 
consideration.   
 Moreover, since we have found that the legal standard 
of the charge survived plenary review on the supposition that a 
proper objection was made to the jury instructions, if we should 
instead determine that defense counsel failed to object to the 
legal propriety of the inclusion of the "the government is not 
required to prove that a defendant knew that his acts were 
  
unlawful" language in the jury instructions, clearly the giving 
of this charge does not constitute plain error.9 
 B. 
 Whether or not defense counsel preserved an objection 
to the legal sufficiency of the charge, counsel clearly objected 
to the charge on the ground that it was potentially confusing to 
the jury.  In reviewing jury instructions, we review the trial 
court's expression for abuse of discretion.  Savarese v. Agriss, 
883 F.2d at 1194; United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988).  We must 
consider "whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the charge as 
a whole fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to 
the jury."  Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d at 727.  We must reverse if 
"the instruction was capable of confusing and thereby misleading 
the jury."  Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d at 727 (citing United 
States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183 (1984)); 
United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987).     
 Examining the jury charge as a whole, we cannot agree 
with Zehrbach and Mervis that the challenged instruction was 
capable of confusing the jury, even in relation to the good faith 
instruction.  Notably, the good faith instruction came after the 
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 This court has defined "plain error" as "those errors that 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings."  United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d at 250 
(internal quotation omitted).  The doctrine is applied 
"`sparingly' . . . and only where the error was sure to have had 
an `unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
  
instructions on "knowingly" and "fraudulently," serving as a 
general statement on the absence or existence of the required 
intent.  The court explained that good faith is an absolute 
defense, that "all evidence bearing on [the] defendant's state of 
mind" should be considered, and that the jury must acquit if they 
had a reasonable doubt about the existence of intent or good 
faith.  Given this language, it is unlikely that the jury 
mistakenly did not consider Mervis and Zehrbach's alleged belief 
in the legality of their actions when the jury was deliberating 
on the question of whether the government had proved fraudulent 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 As a more general matter, the court continuously 
reinforced the notions that the burden of proof in a criminal 
case is always upon the government; that the defendants are 
protected by a presumption of innocence; and that, unless they 
are proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendants must 
be acquitted.  The court repeated these principles at least six 
times during the course of its final instructions to the jury.  
In addition, the court instructed the jury to "consider the 
charge as a whole," rather than "singl[ing] out any one 
instruction."  This reinforces our belief that the jury would not 
have been misled by the single instruction that the government 
need not prove knowledge of illegality.  
 Moreover, when defense counsel first challenged the 
instruction, the court explained that it felt that the 
  
instruction was necessary in order to clarify precisely what 
"knowledge" is required of a defendant who acts "knowingly" in 
the commission of bankruptcy fraud.  That decision was clearly 
committed to the discretion of the district court.  Here, 
Zehrbach and Mervis did not challenge the content of the good 
faith instruction, nor did they propose the inclusion of a 
sentence clarifying the relationship between their claimed 
ignorance of the law and their good faith defense.  They simply 
challenged the inclusion of language which in fact correctly 
commented on an element that the government did not need to 
prove.  Therefore, because we believe that the jury charge, taken 
as a whole, was not misleading or confusing to the jury, we find 
no abuse of discretion. 
 
 III.  THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS. 
 A.  
  We turn next to Zehrbach and Mervis' argument that the 
prosecutor prejudiced their right to a fair trial when he stated 
in his closing argument: 
 I suggest you shouldn't believe Drizos and 
Smith because they're guilty of exactly the 
same bankruptcy fraud that these two 
defendants are guilty of.  And don't you 
assume that they are not going to get what's 
coming to them either.     
Zehrbach and Mervis urge that these remarks comment on the 
credibility of Drizos and Smith, based on facts not in the 
record, and are therefore per se grounds for a new trial under 
  
DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 996.  For the reasons stated below, we will 
overrule the per se rule of DiLoreto.  Rather than using the 
DiLoreto per se rule, we will analyze this case on its own facts.  
In making this analysis, because we must conclude that the 
prosecutor's remarks were improper, we will go on to weigh the 
remarks under a harmless error standard.  See United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). 
 B. 
 Prosecutorial misconduct does not always warrant the 
granting of a mistrial.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
given "the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, 
there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and 
that the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial."  United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has held that an appellate court should not 
exercise its "[s]upervisory power to reverse a conviction . . . 
when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since, by 
definition, the conviction would have been obtained 
notwithstanding the asserted error."  Id. at 506.   
 The harmless error doctrine requires that the court 
consider an error in light of the record as a whole, but the 
standard of review in determining whether an error is harmless 
depends on whether the error was constitutional or non-
constitutional.  In this instance, the alleged error, attacking 
the credibility of a witness with evidence not in the record, is 
  
non-constitutional.  We have held that non-constitutional error 
is harmless when "it is highly probable that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment."  Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976).  "High probability" 
requires that the court possess a "sure conviction that the error 
did not prejudice" the defendant.  United States v. Jannotti, 729 
F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).  
Therefore, we will reverse if we conclude that the prosecutor's 
remarks, taken in the context of the trial as a whole, prejudiced 
the defendants. 
 In determining prejudice, we consider the scope of the 
objectionable comments and their relationship to the entire 
proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions 
given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the 
defendant's conviction.10  As the Supreme Court has emphasized "a 
criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis 
of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or 
conduct must be viewed in context."  United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. at 11 (finding harmless error where the prosecutor had 
stated his opinion that the defendant was guilty and urged the 
jury to "do its job").    
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 See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1355, 1365 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.  Mannino v. United States, 501 
U.S. 1206 (1991); United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985); United States v. 
Homer, 545 F.2d 864, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 954 (1977).   
  
 C. 
 The first sentence of the prosecutor's objectionable 
remarks suggested that the jury should not believe Drizos and 
Smith because they were also guilty of the crimes of which the 
defendants were guilty.  This statement was clearly improper to 
the extent that it reflected the prosecutor's opinion concerning 
the guilt of Mervis and Zehrbach.  As the Supreme Court has held, 
when a prosecutor expresses his personal opinion concerning the 
guilt of the accused, he creates two risks: 
 such comments can convey the impression that 
evidence not presented to the jury, but known 
to the prosecutor, supports the charges 
against the defendant and can thus jeopardize 
the defendant's right to be tried solely on 
the basis of the evidence presented to the 
jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries 
with it the imprimatur of the Government and 
may induce the jury to trust the Government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence. 
 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.   
 In addition, the statement was improper as an 
expression of the prosecutor's personal belief regarding the 
guilt of the two witnesses themselves.11  As the district court 
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  Although counsel may state his views of what the evidence 
shows and the inferences and conclusions that the evidence 
supports, it is clearly improper to introduce information based 
on personal belief or knowledge.  Standard 3-5.8(b) of the 
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provides: 
 It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to 
express his or her personal belief or opinion 
as to the truth or falsity of any testimony 
or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.   
See also ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
3.4(e)(stating that a lawyer shall not "in trial . . . assert 
  
held, however, "[i]t is not impermissible to argue the conclusion 
that witnesses other than the accused are guilty of a crime when 
evidence of such has been produced."  United States v. Zehrbach, 
No. 92-0218, mem. op. at 8.  Evidence regarding Drizos and 
Smith's decision making and supervision of the bid buy-out 
scheme, including testimony by both witnesses as to their active 
participation, supported the prosecutor's challenged remark, 
prompting the district court to conclude that the remark was 
"based on evidence adduced at trial."  Id.  Nonetheless, to the 
extent that the sentence was an expression of the prosecutor's 
personal belief, it was inappropriate and is subject to review 
for prejudicial effect, as is the second sentence of the 
prosecutor's remarks. 
 The second sentence, which entreated the jury not to 
assume that Drizos and Smith were "not going to get what's coming 
to them," was improper and irrelevant, because it referred to 
information outside of the record and sought to influence the 
decision of the jury on an illegitimate basis.  This Court has 
long acknowledged a defendant's "right to have his guilt or 
innocence determined by the evidence presented against him, not 
by what has happened" -- or by what may happen -- "with regard to 
a criminal prosecution against someone else."  United States v. 
(..continued) 
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a 
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a 
cause, the credibility of a witness, . . . or the guilt or 
innocence of an accused"). 
   
  
Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States 
v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1949)).12 
 As the district court concluded in denying Zehrbach's 
motion for a new trial, the prosecutor may have made the remark 
"to keep the jury from reaching a verdict on an improper basis, 
i.e. that all of the guilty parties had not been brought to 
justice, and only the defendants then on trial had been singled 
out for prosecution."  United States v. Zehrbach, No. 92-0218, 
mem. op. at 8-9.  The court's conclusion was consistent with the 
grounds that counsel for Zehrbach originally stated to support 
his motion for a mistrial.  Nonetheless, the remark effectively 
encouraged the jury to reach a guilty verdict on irrelevant and 
illegitimate grounds. 
 Furthermore, given that the prosecutor made the 
statement in question immediately after telling the jury that the 
witnesses should not be believed because they were themselves 
guilty, the comment could also be construed as a comment on the 
witnesses' credibility.  Thus, Zehrbach and Mervis argued that 
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  Likewise, standard 3-5.8(d) of the American Bar 
Association Standards for Criminal Justice explains: 
 The prosecutor should refrain from argument which 
would divert the jury from its duty to decide 
the case on the evidence, by injecting issues 
broader than the guilt or innocence of the 
accused under the controlling law . . . . 
Standard 3-5.9 further advises: 
 It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor 
intentionally to refer to or argue on the 
basis of facts outside the record. 
 
  
this court's holding in United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 
996, required reversal per se. 
 In DiLoreto, the defendants objected to the 
prosecutor's comments in closing argument regarding the 
credibility of the defendants' accomplices, who testified for the 
Government after entering into plea agreements themselves.  The 
prosecutor stated:  "We don't take liars.  We don't put liars on 
the stand.  We don't do that."  DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 998.  
Although the defendants characterized the comments as "improper 
prosecutorial vouching depriving them of a fair trial," the 
district court denied both their motions for mistrial and their 
subsequent request for curative instruction.  On appeal, this 
court vacated and remanded, holding that "a prosecutor's remarks 
regarding the defendant's guilt or a witness' credibility, if 
based on information not adduced at trial, require reversal per 
se."  Id. at 999. 
 The per se reversal standard announced in DiLoreto, 
however, conflicts with Supreme Court case law requiring the 
court to analyze prosecutorial comments case by case, in the 
context of the entire trial, and to reverse only where the 
defendant has suffered prejudice.  United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. at 111-12.  Therefore, we expressly overrule DiLoreto 
insofar as it established a per se, rather than a case by case, 
rule.  We will, therefore, analyze the prosecutor's remark 
pursuant to the harmless error doctrine.  In light of that 
  
analysis, we conclude that both comments, though truly improper 
and unfortunate, do not constitute reversible error. 
 D. 
 Although it is true that irreparable harm may be 
inflicted in a moment, the comments at issue were but two 
sentences in a closing argument that filled forty pages of 
transcript.  Immediately after the objection, the court gave a 
specific instruction to disregard the prosecutor's comment, an 
instruction that the court repeated just a short time later at 
the close of the prosecutor's argument.  As a general matter, the 
court told the jurors to disregard any personal opinion of 
counsel and to base their decision solely on the evidence.  And, 
in its final instructions, the court cautioned the jury members 
that the arguments of counsel are not evidence; that they must 
not be persuaded by bias, prejudice, or sympathy; and that they 
must not consider any evidence that they were earlier instructed 
to disregard.  We believe that this extensive cautioning by the 
court was sufficient to cure the prosecutor's error. 
 Furthermore, the extensive evidence of Zehrbach and 
Mervis's intent to defraud supports our conclusion that the 
prosecutor's remarks would not have prejudiced the jury's 
deliberations.  The evidence clearly supports the government's 
burden of proving that Zehrbach and Mervis knowingly and 
fraudulently paid other bidders to refrain from bidding for 
assets in a bankruptcy auction.   
  
 Zehrbach and Mervis acted in blatant disregard of 
questions about the legality of their actions, and they 
repeatedly mischaracterized the transaction.  In response to 
Polychron's inquiry as to whether the buy-outs were "kosher," 
Mervis promised to obtain an opinion letter from an attorney 
approving the transaction.  Mervis failed to produce such a 
letter.  Moreover, when Attorney Vollmer sent an unsolicited 
letter quoting the relevant criminal statute and strongly 
advising against further participation in the bid buy-out scheme, 
Mervis and Zehrbach chose to disregard it.  Zehrbach made some 
effort to obtain another opinion, from Attorney Crane, to assuage 
concerns.  But Crane's positive opinion affirming the legality of 
"the transaction" rested on a misrepresentation of the 
transaction as a joint-venture rather than a bid buy-out.  In 
fact, in seeking Crane's legal opinion, no one had mentioned to 
him the payments made to Starman and Eckard to refrain from 
bidding.  Mervis was similarly selective in his discussions with 
the bankruptcy trustee and the FBI, referring to the transaction 
as a "merger of interests" or a "joint-venture" and remaining 
silent about the payments.   
 We find the evidence of knowledge and of deception to 
be substantial.  Under these circumstances and given the court's 
curative instructions, we find that the remarks of the prosecutor 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments 
of conviction of the district court. 
 
United States v. Darus H. Zehrbach 
United States v. Alex A. Mervis 
Nos. 93-7477 and 93-7493 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I join in Parts I and II of the majority opinion, and 
in Part III insofar as it overrules the per se rule of DiLoreto.  
However, I cannot join in Part III of the opinion to the extent 
it concludes that the error here was harmless. 
 It is difficult for me to imagine a statement which 
would carry a more powerful impact upon a jury, or which would be 
more likely to deter it from acquitting, than to imply in no 
uncertain terms that the defendants' two chief witnesses were 
going to be indicted for their participation with the defendants 
in the underlying criminal activity.  That is exactly what 
happened here.  The prosecutor's statement was tantamount to 
telling the jury that the defendants' two main witnesses were in 
fact as guilty as the defendants were and would themselves be 
brought to answer criminal charges, despite the fact that there 
  
was no evidence to suggest that these individuals were going to 
be indicted and despite the more compelling fact that they never 
were indicted. 
 The majority acknowledges that "the remark effectively 
encouraged the jury to reach a guilty verdict on irrelevant and 
illegitimate grounds."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 34.  How, then, 
can we be confident that "it is highly probable that the error 
did not contribute to the judgment"?  See Maj. Op. Typescript 
at 31, citing Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 274 
(3d Cir. 1976).  "Highly probable" requires us to be virtually 
certain, as that standard is only satisfied when we hold a "sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice" the defendant.  See 
Maj. Op. Typescript at 31, citing United States v. Jannotti, 729 
F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 880 (1984).  
The majority acknowledges this also, but then shifts its focus 
from the impact of the remarks to the prosecutor's motive in 
uttering them.  I believe this diversion to be the fundamental 
flaw in the majority's analysis.  Since we must be convinced that 
a criminal defendant was not prejudiced for harmless error to 
apply, what difference does it make to that inquiry that the 
prosecutor might have meant something else in uttering the 
offending remarks?  It is not what the prosecutor meant that 
should control, but rather the effect of what he said upon the 
defendants' right to be judged by an untainted jury.  Our focus 
should be to determine that it is almost certain that the error 
  
did not contribute to the conviction.  In my view, the majority 
does not place sufficient emphasis upon this critical inquiry. 
 And it is precisely for this reason that I believe the 
majority fails to perceive the violence which remarks such as 
those at issue are capable of inflicting upon the unfettered 
fact-finding and truth-seeking mission of the jury, preferring 
instead to rely upon the court's cautionary instructions and the 
quantum of evidence properly before the jury which pointed toward 
guilt.  As I stated in my original dissent, "I cannot imagine any 
curative instruction that would be sufficient to purge the jury 
of the powerful impact of such an improper, unfounded assertion 
by the prosecutor."  United States v. Zehrbach, Nos. 93-7477 and 
93-7493 at 8 (Lewis, J. dissenting).  I believe this is 
particularly true in view of the fact that to a considerable 
degree, the defendants' convictions rested upon the jury's 
assessment of the credibility of Drizos and Smith.  Moreover, I 
am not persuaded that the jury could not have been influenced by 
these improper remarks, to the prejudice of the defendants, 
regardless of the weight of additional evidence demonstrating 
their guilt. 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
  
 
 
